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We consider the interaction of trade and technology di⁄usion in a
two-region model of innovation and imitation. We ￿nd that globalization,
either in the form of lower trade barriers or in faster di⁄usion of technology
between innovator and imitator spurs innovation, bene￿ting both regions.
1 Introduction
How does the degree of openness a⁄ect the incentives to innovate, and, thus,
the ultimate level of income in the world? This question has been posed in
a number of contexts in which openness has meant di⁄erent things. It could
refer to the absence of trade barriers, but also to the absence of barriers to the
di⁄usion of ideas. A number of papers have looked at the e⁄ect of one type of
openness taking the degree of openness of the other type as given. Examples
are Helpman (1993), Eaton, Gutierrez, and Kortum (1998), Eaton and Kortum
(1999), and Eaton and Kortum (2001). In some situations. Helpman (1993),
for example, ￿nds in a model with an innovating and imitating country, with
costless trade and the absence of intellectual property protection in the imitating
country, faster di⁄usion can spur innovation by reducing the wage, and hence
the cost of innovation, in the innovating country. In a model with no di⁄usion,
Eaton and Kortum (2001) ￿nd that the degree of openness to trade has no
e⁄ect on innovative activity: While trade increases the size of the market that a
successful innovator can hope to capture, it also means that an innovator faces
a higher hurdle in terms of competition from abroad. In their model, unlike
Helpman, all countries engage in innovative activity.1
To explore these issues further we develop a two-country model, like Help-
man￿ s, of innovation and di⁄usion. Initially we allow both countries to innovate,
1In multicountry models of innovation and di⁄usion that are ￿t to cross-country data on
patenting and research activity, Eaton, Gutierrez, and Kortum (1998) and Eaton and Kortum
(1999) ￿nd, like Helpman, that greater di⁄usion spurs growth. Their models, unlike Helpman￿ s
have no trade.
1and for ideas to di⁄use between them. Unlike Helpman, we allow for an arbi-
trary level of trade barriers, with costless trade a special case. We then explore
the incentives to innovate in a special case in which only one country innovates.
We ￿nd that faster di⁄usion and lower trade barriers spur innovation.
We proceed as follows.
Section 2 develops a static two-country model of technology, production, and
trade along the lines of the Ricardian model developed in Eaton and Kortum
(2002). In their many country model, the distribution of e¢ ciencies is treated
as independent from country to country. Such an outcome is consistent, for
example, with a world in which each country relied on its own innovations for
production, or one in which innovations applying to a particular good in one
country applied to a di⁄erent one where they di⁄used. Here we consider the
much more complicated case in which innovations, when they di⁄use, apply to
the same goods. Hence we need to distinguish between innovations that are in
the exclusive domain of the innovating country, and those that have di⁄used to
a common pool, which other countries can access. Because of the many di⁄erent
situations that can arise, we limit ourselves to a two-country case. Even here we
need to distinguish among situations in which: (i) one country produces using
only those ideas that are exclusive to it, while only the other country uses ideas
that have ￿ owed into the common pool, (ii) both countries use ideas that have
￿ owed into the common pool, with one exporting goods produced using those
ideas to the other, and (iii) both countries use ideas that have ￿ owed into the
common pool, with goods produced using those ideas nontraded.
Section 3 introduces dynamics into the analysis. Each country innovates at
an exogenous rate, and ideas di⁄use from one to another at exogenous rates. The
processes of innovation and di⁄usion generate a world steady-state growth rate
in which the two countries, depending on their abilities to innovate and to absorb
ideas from abroad, will, except by coincidence, have di⁄erent relative income
levels. As in Krugman (1979), the framework delivers "product cycles" in which
the innovator initially exports the good using the technology it has developed,
but later imports it once the technology has di⁄used abroad. In our model
other outcome are possible, however. If the innovation is su¢ ciently small,
before di⁄usion, the other country may continue to produce the good on its own
using inferior technology rather than import the good from the innovator. In
fact, its own technology could even be superior, so that the innovation is never
useful outside the country of innovation.
Section 4 considers a special case in which only one of the two countries
innovates, but ties the rate of innovation to the return on innovation. Here we
consider the role of openness in the form of (i) lower trade barriers and (ii) faster
di⁄usion on innovative activity.
2 A Model of Technology, Production, and Trade
Following, for example, Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977, henceforth
DFS) we consider a world with a unit continuum of goods, which we label by
2j 2 [0;1]: The production structure is Ricardian. There are two countries, which
we label N (for North) and S (for South). Each country has a set of available
technologies for making each of the goods on a continuum. Some technologies,
denoted N; are available only to the North while another set, S; are available
exclusively to the South. A third set C are commonly available. A technology is
the ability to produce zi(j) units of good j with one worker, where, depending
on which type of technology we are talking about, i = N;S;C. Here we treat
the zi(j)￿ s as realizations of random variables Zi drawn independently for each
j from the Frechet distributions:
Fi(z) = Pr[Zi ￿ z] = exp[￿Tiz￿￿]:
which are independent across i = N;S;C: In this static context the Ti￿ s re￿ ect
the di⁄erences in average e¢ ciencies across the three sets of technologies. (We
consider how these distributions arise from a dynamic process of innovation and
di⁄usion below.)
The best technologies available in country i are thus
Z￿




i (z) = Pr[Z￿
i ￿ z] = exp[￿T￿
i z￿￿]
where T￿
i = Ti + TC:
Eaton and Kortum (2002) consider a case in which there is no common
technology, so that TC = 0: An implication is that the distribution of e¢ ciencies
available to each country is independent. here there is independence across the
exclusive technologies, but the common technologies are perfectly correlated.
Because of this correlation between Z￿
N and Z￿
S, we will ￿nd it easier to work
with the three independent technologies ZN;ZS;and ZC; introduced above.
There are LN workers in the North and LS workers in the South. As is
standard in a Ricardian setting, workers are identical and mobile across activities
within a country, but cannot change countries. The wage is wN in the North
and wS in the South. We take the wage in the South to be the numeraire,
although we sometimes leave wS in formulas for clari￿cation. The labor market
clearing conditions establish the relative wage. Without loss of generality we
will impose restrictions on exogenous variables so that in equilibrium wN ￿ wS.
As in DFS, demand is Cobb-Douglas. Hence expenditure in country i on
good j is:
Xi(j) = Yn:
where Yn is total expenditure.2
Goods can be transported between the countries, but in order to deliver one
unit in the destination d ￿ 1 units need to be shipped from the source (the stan-
dard ￿iceberg" assumption). Unfortunately, even in low dimensional Ricardian
2Below we consider the case in which technologies and the labor forces evolve over time.
Since in the next section we solve the static equilibrium given these magnitudes, We omit
time subscripts for the time being.
3problems, taxonomies are inevitable. There are three possible cases to consider:
(1) If, in equilibrium, wN > wSd then the commonly available technology will
be used only in the South; the North will use only those technologies that it has
unique access to. (2) If in equilibrium wN = wSd then the commonly available
technology may be used in both countries, but goods produced using this tech-
nology are exported only by the South. (3) If in equilibrium wSd ￿ wN ￿ wS=d
then each country will use the commonly available technology. Goods produced
using this technology are not traded since it will be more expensive to import
the good than to make it oneself.
2.1 Cost Distributions, Market Structure, and Labor De-
mand
To mitigate the proliferation of special cases we introduce the notation wNC =
minfwSd;wNg for the wage paid to labor producing goods using the com-
mon technology and sold in the North (inclusive of transport cost),. so that
wNC=zC(j) is the cost of selling good j in the North if it is produced using the
common technology. In the ￿rst case above wNC = wSd while in the second
two wNC = wN:
The least cost means of obtaining good j in the North is thus:
cN(j) = minfwN=zN(j);wNC=zC(j);wSd=zS(j)g
while in the South it is:
cS(j) = minfwNd=zN(j);wS=zC(j);wS=zS(j)g
since, under our assumptions, the South always buys goods using the common
technology from itself.
For i = N;S; the lowest cost ci(j) is the realization of a random variable Ci
whose distribution is determined by the distribution of the underlying technolo-
gies Zi:. We denote the cost distribution in i by Hi(c) = Pr[Ci ￿ c]. The cost
distribution in the North is:
HN(c) = 1 ￿ Pr[ZN ￿ wN=c]Pr[ZS ￿ wSd=c]Pr[ZC ￿ wNC=c]
= 1 ￿ FN(wN=c)FS(wSd=c)FC(wNC=c)
= 1 ￿ exp
￿
￿￿Nc￿￿
where ￿N = TNw
￿￿
N + TS(wSd)￿￿ + TCw
￿￿
NC. Similarly, for the South:
HS(c) = 1 ￿ Pr[ZN ￿ wNd=c]Pr[ZS ￿ wS=c]Pr[ZC ￿ wS=c]
= 1 ￿ exp
￿
￿￿Sc￿￿
where ￿S = TN(wNd)￿￿ + TSwS
￿￿ + TCw
￿￿
S = TN(wNd)￿￿ + T￿
SwS
￿￿.
For now we assume that prices are proportional to costs as in the case of
perfect competition. To solve for the labor market equilibrium we need to specify
the demand for labor as a function of the relative wage.
4As demonstrated in EK (2002), the fraction of goods j purchased in the











Hence ￿NN is the fraction of the North￿ s expenditure devoted to goods pro-
duced with exclusively Northern technology while ￿NS is the fraction the South
spends on goods produced with the exclusively Northern technology. For now
we assume that all workers are engaged in production and that labor is the only
source of income. Hence spending in country i is wiLi: With Cobb-Douglas
technologies total spending on goods produced with the exclusively Northern
technology is thus ￿NNwNLN + ￿SNwSLS:
Finally, as shown in EK (2002), the price index in country i is Pi = ￿￿
￿1=￿
i ;
i = N;S where ￿ is Euler￿ s constant.3
To derive the wage we need to distinguish the three kinds of equilibria:
2.1.1 Case 1: The North uses only its Exclusive Technology
In this case, since only the South uses the commonly available technology,
wNC = wSd: Since Northern labor is employed using only the North￿ s exclusive






























The solution needs to satisfy the condition that wN > d in order for the North
not to use the commonly accessible technology. While the equation does not
admit an analytic solution it is easy to solve numerically.
Since the North does not use any of the commonly produced technology, all
goods produced are equally tradable regardless of which technology they employ.
The fact that the North has access to the common technology is irrelevant since
it doesn￿ t use it. The outcome is isomorphic to one in which the North only
knows the technologies that are exclusive to it, while the common technologies
are exclusive to the South, as would be the case in EK (2002).
3Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) show how these results generalize straight-
forwardly to preferences with constant elasticity of substitution (CES).
52.1.2 Case 2: The North and the South both use the Common Tech-
nology, with Trade in Some Goods Produced using that Tech-
nology
In this case wNC = wN = wSd; so that wN = d . The demand for labor LE
N to















For this case to emerge parameter values must be such that this ratio does not
exceed one. Otherwise we are in case 1 above. We also need that the demand
for workers using the South￿ s exclusive technology LE
S not exceed the supply of













not exceed one. Otherwise we are in case 3 below.
In this case the range of goods produced using the common technology in
the North are not traded. Hence technology di⁄usion results in less trade than
would otherwise occur.
2.1.3 Case 3: Goods Produced with the Common Technology are
not Traded














Again, there is no analytic solution but solving for the wage numerically is
straightforward.
All goods produced using the common technology are not traded. In this
case technology di⁄usion reduces the scope for trade even further.
2.2 Trade and Prices
What is the relationship between technology, wages, and prices in each of these
cases? In case 1 and 2 the wage in the North is higher than that in the South
by a factor of at least d while the prices of goods produced using the common
technology are higher by a factor of exactly d. In case 2, some of these goods
are produced in both countries using the same technology. In contrast, goods
produced with the Northern technology are more expensive in the South by a
factor d: In this case the model delivers the implication that nontraded goods
are cheaper in the South.
63 Technology Dynamics
We have so far considered the static equilibrium in which labor forces and lev-
els of technology are given. Over time, however, we can envisage processes of
innovation and di⁄usion governing the evolution of TNt; TSt; and TCt over time
(introducing a time subscript). Following the speci￿cation in Krugman (1979),
for example, we can imagine that each country innovates at a rate that is pro-
portional to its current knowledge, and that ideas ￿ ow from the exclusive to the
common pool at rates that are proportional to the stocks of exclusive ideas. We
introduce four parameters, ￿N; the rate at which the North innovates, ￿S; the
rate at which the South innovates, ￿N; the rate at which the South learns about
exclusively Northern ideas, and ￿S; the rate at which the North learns about




= (￿N ￿ ￿N)TNt + ￿NTCt
dTSt
dt
= (￿S ￿ ￿S)TSt + ￿STCt
dTCt
dt
= ￿NTNt + ￿STSt:
While the analytic solution to this dynamic system is complex, it is straight-
forward to show that as long as the innovation and di⁄usion parameters are
strictly positive and the initial value of at least one Ti is positive, the system
evolves to a steady state in which all three types of knowledge grow at the same
rate.
In general, the resulting growth rate is the solution to an unpleasant cu-
bic equation. It can be shown, however, that the steady-state growth rate is
increasing in both innovation and di⁄usion parameters. In the special case of
symmetry, ￿N = ￿S = ￿; and ￿N = ￿S = ￿; the steady-state growth rate is merely
quadratic:
g =






strictly increasing in ￿ and ￿: A world with more innovation but also more
di⁄usion grows faster.
Krugman (1979) considers what happens when only the North innovates, so
that iS = 0:and the growth rate is just ￿N while TS = 0: This case is the one we
pursue from now on. Since ￿S and ￿S are irrelevant we set ￿N = ￿ and ￿N = ￿:
In steady state TN and TC each grow at rate ￿ and TN=TC = ￿=￿:However, we
wish to endogenize ￿ to see how it reacts to more rapid di⁄usion (higher ￿) and
lower trade barriers (lower d).
74 Endogenizing Innovation
We now amend the model to endogenize the Northern innovation rate ￿: Follow-
ing, for example, the two-country analysis of Grossman and Helpman (1991), we
can introduce an endogenous innovation process. Since only the North innovates
we eliminate case 3 above from the range of possibilities. We continue to assume
that exclusive Northern ideas ￿ ow into common knowledge at an exogenous rate
￿ (suppressing the subscript since it is now unnecessary).
As in Kortum (1997), we model innovation as the production of ideas. An
idea is a way to produce a good j with output per worker q: We assume that
an idea is equally likely to apply to any good in the unit interval, and that q is
the realization of a random variable Q drawn from the Pareto distribution:
F(q) = Pr[Q ￿ q] = 1 ￿ q￿￿:
Only an idea that lowers the cost of serving a market will be used. Initially,
ideas will only be usable in the North. Hence to lower the cost of serving the
Northern market an idea q must satisfy:
wN=q ￿ cN(j) = min[wN=zN(j);dwS=zC(j)]
where zN(j) and zC(j) represent the states of the art in the exclusively Northern
and commonly available technologies, respectively. To lower the cost of serving
the Southern market it must satisfy:
wNd=q ￿ cS(j) = min[wNd=zN(j);wS=zC(j)]
Note that the second criterion is more stringent. Hence some innovations will
initially be used only for the Northern market while others will be sold to the
world market. Moreover, to be useful in either market the innovation must
exceed the Northern state of the art.
The probability that the idea constitutes an innovation in the North is thus:
Pr[wN=Q ￿ cN(j)] = Pr[Q ￿ wN=cN(j)] = [wN=cN(j)]￿￿
while the probability that it is useful in the South is:
Pr[wNd=Q ￿ cS(j)] = Pr[Q ￿ wNd=cS(j)] = [wNd=cS(j)]￿￿
We need to introduce an incentive for the North to innovate. We follow the
quality ladders framework (Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Aghion and Howitt,
1992) an posit that the owner of an innovation has the ability to use it to
produce and sell a product at the highest price that keeps the competition at
bay. Thus an innovation for producing good j with worker productivity z(j)
allows the owner to produce the good at unit cost c(1)(j) = w=z(j) the next
cheapest source has unit cost c(2)(j) then the innovation allows the seller to
charge a markup c(2)(j)=c(1)(j):
84.1 The Distribution of the Mark Up
We ￿rst derive the distribution of the markup in the North. For an idea that
is exclusively available to its Northern inventor, the markup for producing a
good with an e¢ ciency of Q (drawn from the distribution LINK), which would
otherwise cost some amount CNt in the North (drawn from the distribution
LINK) is MNt = CNt=(wN=Q) (where capital letters denote random variables).
The probability that the markup exceeds some value m is:




















TNt + TCt (wN=wNC)
￿m￿￿:
(Since we consider a steady state in which wN is constant, we do not index it









The equivalent derivation for using a Northern technology to sell in the South
yields:






TNt + TCt (wNd=wS)
￿m￿￿:
Turning to an idea that has passed into the common technology, the markup
for producing a good with an e¢ ciency of Q , which would otherwise cost
some amount CNt in the North (drawn from the distribution LINK) is MNt =
CNt=(wNC=Q): The probability it exceeds some value m is:







TCt + TNt (wNC=wN)
￿m￿￿:
9Finally, the distribution of the markup for selling a good using the common
technology in the South is:







TCt + TNt [wS=(wNd)]
￿m￿￿:
In any of these cases, an idea will be used if and only if m ￿ 1. The




= 1 ￿ m￿￿ i = N;S; i0 = N;C:
the simple Pareto distribution with parameter ￿:
With these expressions in hand we are now armed to confront the pro￿t
calculations.
4.2 Pro￿ts
We are now in a position to derive the expected pro￿t stream from a new
invention. An issue we need to confront is what happens when an idea di⁄uses
to the common technology. There are many possible cases to consider. At one
extreme this di⁄usion could mark the end of the inventor￿ s exclusive use of the
idea anywhere, so that her pro￿t streams end. At the other the inventor could
retain the right to use the idea anywhere, in which case di⁄usion allows the
possibility of relocating production to the South in order to exploit the lower
wage there. In between are situations in which she keeps her rights in the North
but not the South. We begin with the case of universal intellectual property
protection.
Let￿ s assume that we are in Case 2, in which the North and the South both
use the common technology, so that wSd = wN = wNC: In this case di⁄usion
does not a⁄ect the pro￿t stream earned from sales in the North, since the South
has no cost advantage for selling in the North. Di⁄usion will allow greater
revenue in the South, however. We assume that the labor forces in each country
grow at rate n; and denote the ratio of the Southern to Northern labor force as
￿:
We ￿rst calculate the expected pro￿t stream from selling in the North. At
any time s the distribution of the markup for a technology still in use is G(m):
For a markup m the pro￿t is (1 ￿ m￿1)YN; where YN is total spending by
Northerners. Since we use the Southern wage as numeraire, as we show below,
in steady state YN grows at rate n.
Integrating across the markup distribution G(m); the expected ￿ ow of pro￿t




(1 ￿ m￿1)dG(m) =
YNt
1 + ￿
The probability that the technology is in use at time s is bNNs(1): Since we have
made the Southern wage the numeraire, and the Northern wage is proportional
to it, technical progress lowers the price level over time. As indicated above,
the price level is PNt = ￿￿
￿￿
Nt: The expected real discounted pro￿t from an idea





















where ￿ is the discount factor. Since in steady state ￿Nt = TNtw
￿￿
N (1 + ￿=￿);





￿Nt (1 + ￿)
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￿Nt (1 + ￿)(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿=￿ ￿ n)
=
YNt
TNt(1 + ￿=￿)(1 + ￿)(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿=￿ ￿ n)
:





(1 ￿ m￿1)dG(m) =
YSt
1 + ￿
where YS is total spending by Southerners, which also grows at rate n in steady
state.
In calculating the value of an idea in serving the Southern market, we need to
distinguish between pro￿ts earned while the idea remains exclusively Northern
and those earned after it has transited into the common technology. Given our
assumptions the ￿rst would be produced in the North and the second in the
South.
The probability that an idea created at time t remains exclusively Northern
at time s is exp[￿￿(s ￿ t)], while otherwise it has transited into the common
technology pool. The probability that a Northern technology is used for serving
the South at time s is bSNs(1) and the probability that a common technology is
serving the South at time s is bSCs(1):The price level in the South is PSt = ￿￿
￿￿
St :
Putting these items together, the expected real discounted pro￿t from serving


























(TNt + d2￿￿=￿)(1 + ￿)
￿
d2￿
￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿=￿ ￿ n
+
1 ￿ d2￿
￿ + ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿=￿ ￿ n
￿
Hence the total value of an idea at time t is:















(1 + d2￿￿=￿)(￿ + ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿=￿ ￿ n)
￿
:
Having solved for the value of an idea, we can now examine the amount of
innovation that the North will engage in.
4.3 The Rate of Innovation
Northern workers engaging in R&D produce ideas. We assume that a Northern
worker can produce ideas at a Poisson rate ￿: Hence the return to research is ￿Vt:
An equilibrium in which the North is both producing goods and undertaking
research thus requires that the return to research equal the Northern wage, i.e.:
￿Vt = d:
Since all Southern workers produce, and the South earns no income from inven-
tions, YSt = LSt: Since Northern workers engage in research and earns pro￿ts
both in the North and in the South, the expression for its income is more com-










[(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ r)d + ￿]:
We de￿ne the ratio of Northern technology to Northern workers at time t as














￿ (n + ￿):
where rNt is the fraction of the Northern labor force doing research. In steady
state both rNt and tNt are constant, so that tN = ￿r=(n + ￿) and ￿ = n:
12Substituting these expressions into the condition for labor market equilib-
rium allows us to solve for the steady state share of Northern workers who





















(￿ + ￿)￿ ￿ n
The expression for research intensity is complicated, but in three special cases
it reduces to something simple and intuitive:
1. When S is small relative to N (￿ = 0) it becomes r = n=￿￿; what Eaton
and Kortum (2001) get for the case of the closed economy and for sym-
metric research economies. Not surprisingly, globalization in the form of
lower transport costs and faster di⁄usion has no e⁄ect, since the South
doesn￿ t matter.
2. When trade is costless, so that d = 1;:it becomes r = n(1+￿)=￿￿: A larger
south scales up research in the North in proportion to its size. Since the
wage is the same in each country, the speed of di⁄usion doesn￿ t matter.
3. When research di⁄uses to the common pool instantaneously, as ￿ 7! 1;
r = n(1 + ￿=d)=￿￿: The e⁄ect of the South on research is diminished by
the extend of the transport cost. In this case globalization in the form of
lower trade barriers raises research e⁄ort.
What about more di¢ cult cases? Given the complexity of the algebra, an
analytic answer is hard to discern. However, a numerical evaluation using a
wide range of parameter values suggested that, both increases in the rate of
di⁄usion ￿ and reductions in trade barriers d; spur innovation.
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